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Property tax limitations, as well as other tax and expenditure restrictions on state and 
local governments in the United States, date back to the late nineteenth century. A surge 
in property tax limitation legislation occurred in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and its 
effects on government revenue, school financing, and educational quality have been 
studied extensively. However, there is surprisingly little literature on how property tax 
limits affect housing markets. For the first time, we examine the impacts of property tax 
limitations on housing growth, in addition to their impacts on housing prices.  Using 
state-level data over twenty-three years, we find that property tax limits  increase housing 
prices (indexes) by approximately 1.6%.  These limits appear to have little impact on the 
growth in the housing stock, as measured by the number of permits.  Our evidence 
suggests that this is because while property tax limits reduce property taxes they also in-
crease the price of housing.  These two counteracting effects lead to ambiguous impacts 
on the gross price of housing.  
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1. Introduction 
 
  It has been thirty years since the passage of Proposition 13, California’s voter-initiated limit 
on local property taxes. While this may be the most notable legislation imposed in the “taxpayer re-
volt” from 1978 to 1981, it was by no means the only property tax limit passed during this period – 
fifteen other states enacted similar limits. While voter-initiated tax and expenditure limits received a 
great deal of media attention during that time, constraints on local government tax rates and levies 
date back to the 1880’s. After a lull in activity in the 1980’s, the early 1990’s brought another flurry 
of activity in limit legislation. And recently, after another lull of approximately fifteen years, there 
again seems to be renewed interest in limits. 
  These limits have been the subject of numerous academic studies since the imposition of 
Proposition 13. Not surprisingly, the vast majority of these studies focus on how these limits have 
affected local government fiscal conditions, including property and other tax revenues but especially 
expenditures on, as well as the quality of, primary and secondary education (Downes (1992), Figlio 
(1997, 1998), Downes et al. (1998), Downes and Figlio (1999)). In contrast to the vast majority of 
the literature on tax and expenditure limits, our interest is not on how these limits affect local 
government spending and revenue decisions but on how they affect housing markets.  Given that 
property taxes are, in large part, a significant tax on the housing stock it is surprising to us that the 
impact of these limits on housing markets has received so little attention.  While the direct effect of 
tax and expenditure limits on housing might be reductions in the property tax rate, the impacts of 
tax and expenditure limits on other local and state taxes and revenues services and the quality of 
local public services will also influence the price of and growth in housing.
1  
Other studies examine what brought about these limits, particularly the voter-initiated ones, 
seeking to understand why voters impose state-level constraints on their elected local officials. 
                                                 
1As this literature has been reviewed relatively recently in Shadbegian (1999), McGuire (1999), and Downes and Figlio 
(1999), we provide only a limited and general discussion of the findings of the numerous articles on this topic.    3
O’Sullivan et al. (1995) notes that between 1960 and 1975 the share of national income in property 
taxes was 4.1 – 4.3 percent in contrast to a level of 3.3 – 3.5 percent found from approximately 1945 
to 1960. Fishel (1989) argues that the equalization of educational resources mandated by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court decision in Serrano v. Priest (1971) brought about Proposition 13 by severing the 
link between local tax efforts and local resources for education. Three studies (Citrin (1979), Cour-
ant et al. (1980), Ladd and Wilson (1982)) report the findings of surveys of voters for three different 
states: California (Proposition 13), Michigan (Headley and Tisch admendments), and Massachusetts 
(Proposition 2½).  All three studies suggest that voters were seeking reductions in tax payments and 
neither reductions in government services nor tax reform, that is, increases in other taxes in place of 
the property tax.  
While voters may have had reductions in overall tax burdens in mind when they approved 
limits on property taxation, we should expect some differences between the impacts of property tax 
limits and those of general revenue limits. Specifically, as a major source of property tax revenue is 
housing, we might expect to observe impacts in housing markets as a consequence of property tax 
limitations.  
This paper adds to the nascent literature concerning the effect of property tax limits on 
housing markets and specifically on the growth in housing stocks. A large literature beginning with 
Oates (1969) examines how property taxes affect property values. Only one paper of which we are 
aware, Bradbury et al. (2001), examines how property tax limits affect housing prices. We are not 
aware of any studies examining how these limits might affect housing stocks. Moreover, most of 
these studies focus on a single housing market, generally a metropolitan area, and for a relatively 
short time period. That these studies generally examine the impacts of property taxation in a single 
metropolitan area is consistent with their theoretical underpinning of the Tiebout (1956) hypothesis. 
Capitalization of property taxes as well as other local taxes and expenditures requires mobility of   4
households among alternative jurisdictions. Household mobility, particularly in the short run, is 
more likely to occur within a small geographic area encompassing a single labor market rather than 
in a larger area such as a region or nation composed of many geographically distinct labor markets.  
  While numerous studies have examined how public policies influence housing prices, almost 
nothing has been published that considers how state and local policies might influence the housing 
stock, particularly the growth in it. The limited number of studies on housing growth might be best 
classified as “macroeconomic” studies of adjustments in a long-term investment, housing, in re-
sponse to underlying macroeconomic factors including interest rates, population growth, and growth 
in the economy (Maisel (1963), Muth (1981), Toppel and Rosen (1988), Mankiw and Weil (1989)). In 
contrast to these studies but similar to our study, studies by McDonald and McMillen (2000) and 
Skidmore and Peddle (1998) focus on differences in growth rates across jurisdictions. Skidmore and 
Peddle (1998), similar to us, focus on the impact of policy differences on residential development.   
While their interest is primarily in development impact fees, they also estimate the relationship be-
tween property tax revenue (per household) and building permits, finding negative and at least mar-
ginally significant results. A study by Bates and Santerre (2003) examines how minimum educational 
requirements affect property values and has some similarities to this study. Perhaps most closely 
related to our study is Lutz (2008) which examines how “fiscal surpluses” created by educational 
funding affects residential development. The study uses data from both New Hampshire following a 
major educational reform there and for the entire United States based the impact of changes in 
educational reform in the 1980’s on housing growth between 1980 and 1990.   
Unlike most of these studies, we use data over a long span of time, twenty-five years. While 
it may be unreasonable to think that households respond to differences in state and local policies in 
the course of a few years, given that some of the most significant legislation occurred over twenty-
five years ago, by now we should expect to see some evidence of its impacts on housing markets.    5
Our strategy is to examine the impact of tax and expenditure limits on housing prices and 
the growth in the housing stock both directly and indirectly.  Our “direct” approach is to estimate 
reduced form equations for housing prices and the growth in the housing stock that include 
measures of tax and expenditure limits as explanatory variables but do not include any measures of 
government revenues and expenditures including the property tax.  Using this approach we find that 
property tax limits have a positive impact on housing prices, increasing them by approximately 1.6 
percent.  Limits on educational spending decrease housing prices by about two percent and limits on 
general revenue increase housing prices by two percent.   
In contrast to the result for housing prices, using our direct approach we find no evidence 
that either limits on property taxes or on educational spending have any statistically significant im-
pact on growth in the housing stock.  However, using this direct approach, we find that limits on 
general revenue increase the growth in housing by about 7.3 percent. 
  If tax limits do reduce government expenditures or the quality of government services, the 
positive relationship between educational expenditures or educational output and property values 
found in numerous studies would suggest that while a reduction in the property tax rate may directly 
increase property values, any associated reductions in services reduce property values. To determine 
how tax limits affect public services and other sources of revenue, we test the impacts of tax and 
expenditure limits on housing markets by estimating a system of equations that includes equations 
for property tax revenue, educational spending, other local revenue, state own-source revenue, and 
other state and local revenues in addition to equations for the price of and growth in the housing 
stock.  In this system we include tax and expenditure limits as explanatory variables in our equations 
for government revenues and expenditures but not in the equations determining the price of 
housing and growth in the housing stock.  Instead, we include our measures of government 
revenues and expenditures in these equations.  In this case, the impact of tax limits on housing is   6
through their impacts on government revenues and expenditures. 
  Using this indirect approach, we again find that property tax limits, as well as general reve-
nue limits, increase housing prices while limits on educational spending reduce them. We again find 
no evidence that property tax limits affect growth in the housing stock. While this conclusion is the 
same as we find with our direct test, these tests provide more insight into how these limits affect 
housing markets.  Specifically, we find that while the reductions in property taxes that occur as a re-
sult of a limited increase in the housing stock, the increase in the price of housing that occurs as a 
result of a property tax limit acts to reduce growth. On net, these counteracting effects combine to 
result in no statistically significant impact on housing growth.  Counter to what we found in our 
reduced-form estimation, we find that educational limits have a positive and significant impact on 
growth in the housing stock while general revenue limits were not found to have any statistical 
impacts. 
  In the next section, we briefly describe the history and measurement of tax limits. In Section 3 
we provide a simple heuristic model to highlight the expected impact of property tax limitations on 
both housing prices and the housing stock. Section 4 has a discussion of our data and the empirical 
methodology while the empirical results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 discusses directions for 
further research and concludes. 
2.   Tax Limits: Their History and Measurement 
   Table 1 gives a chronology of the tax and expenditure limits for each state.
2 While there is a 
long history among states of these limits, there is no question that the late 1970’s and early 1980’s 
was a period of increased activity and interest in tax and expenditure limits. From 1978 to 1982, six-
teen states enacted some form of tax or expenditure limit. While the late 1980’s saw little in the way 
of additional legislation, in the 1990’s several states have passed or revised property tax rate or levy 
                                                 
2The discussion in this section draws heavily from ACIR (1995), and reflects updates reported in Mullins and Wallin 
(2004) and Anderson (2006).     7
limits. 
  There are seven standard classifications for tax and expenditure limits with four classifications 
specific to property taxes: an overall tax rate limit, a specific tax rate limit, a revenue (levy) limit, and 
limit on increases in assessments. In addition to limits on property taxes some states have enacted 
general revenue limits, general expenditure limits, or “Full Disclosure” legislation that are not re-
ported in Table 1.  Overall property tax rate limits set a ceiling on property tax rates for all local 
governments (generally the combined county, municipal, school district tax rate) that can only be ex-
ceeded by popular vote, while specific tax rate limits, the most common form of tax and expenditure 
limits, set ceilings on the tax rates of specific types of local governments (either county, municipal, 
or school district). Property tax levy limits constrain the amount of revenue collected from the pro-
perty tax though they are often designed to allow for an annual percentage increase in the levy (as in 
Massachusett’s Proposition 2½) and frequently adjusted for the impacts of growth and additional de-
velopment on levies. Finally, assessment increase limits constrain how much local governments can 
increase revenues by increasing assessments. Similar to revenue limits, these limits also are frequently 
on the growth of assessments and adjusted for development. Currently thirty-six states have some 
combination of these limits with twelve states limiting overall tax limits; thirty states limit specific 
local governments’ tax rates; twenty-seven states limit local tax levies; and fifteen states limit the 
growth in assessments. 
  Most recent studies (for example, Preston and Ichniowski (1991), Joyce and Mullins (1991), 
Shadbegian (1998) and Figlio (1997)) make a distinction between binding and non-binding (or some-
times potentially binding) limitations. Generally, the rule followed in classifying property tax limits is 
that rate or assessment limits are only binding in combination while levy limits are binding alone. 
Following many of these studies on the impacts of property tax limits on local government finances, 
in our examination of their impacts on housing markets, we focus on binding limits.  However, in   8
addition we examine the impact of the each of the three distinct forms of property tax limits as well
3. 
  Of course, while levy limits or the combinations of rate and assessment limits may constrain 
property tax revenues, they may not constrain other sources of local revenues. If the objective of the 
legislation is to limit local expenditures or revenues rather than alter the source of revenues, states 
may resort to general revenue or expenditure limits. These are generally specific to the level of 
government and are often indexed. These are also more commonly imposed on state governments; 
currently, only two states impose revenue limits and eight states impose expenditure limits. While 
these types of limits are less frequently used than tax limitations, in our empirical work we also 
consider their impacts on government revenues and expenditures and housing markets. 
3.  What Impact Might Property Tax Limitations have on Housing Prices and Construction? 
  At first glance, a reduction in the property tax rate should reduce the gross price of housing 
to households and therefore increase their demand for it. However the assumption of an elastic sup-
ply of housing is at odds with the voluminous literature on capitalization suggesting that property tax 
increases reduce housing prices. In the case of full capitalization, the gross price of housing is unaf-
fected by the reduction (or increase) in the property tax. To more thoroughly examine the expected 
impacts of property tax limits on housing markets we consider a simple static model. As our empiri-
cal work examines the impacts of limits on building permits, the more appropriate model would be 
dynamic with the equilibrium characterized by a steady-state growth rate. After our analysis of the 
static model, we briefly address the implications of limits on growth rates in the housing stock.  
3.1  A Simple Model of Capitalization and Residential Development  
  Assuming that households are mobile among markets (states), in equilibrium they choose the 
state that maximizes their utility. For simplicity, we assume households are identical, meaning that in 
                                                 
3Another potentially complicating factor, which we do not consider here, is when a state limits assessments on residential 
property but not commercial property. This has the effect over time of shifting the tax base away from homeowners 
towards business owners.   9
equilibrium they should be indifferent between living in any state. Then let the indirect utility 
function be expressed by 
  () U a g t p V i i i i i = + , , ), 1 ( τ          (3.1) 
where τ is the property tax rate, g is a measure of public services, t is an alternative tax (possibly state  
 
income), and a represents amenities in state i. The term U  is the level of utility obtainable to res- 
 
idents in any of the regions. Then (3.1) implicitly defines the housing price function p(τi,ti,gi,ai) with 
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4 The sign of (3.2) is ambiguous. If public services are 
efficiently provided then (3.2) will equal zero; underprovision of public services results in (3.2) being  
 
positive and overprovision means that it is negative.
5 Thus when we consider the impact of changes 
in property tax limitations, not only do we need to consider how these how tax limits affect property 
taxes but also how they affect public services and other taxes.  
In addition, the land market in each state must be in equilibrium. With an elastic housing 
stock this equilibrium condition is  
  () () i i i i i i p h r l n r L τ + = 1 ) ( ) (          (3.3) 
 
where  ri is the land rent, Li(ri) is the amount of land available for residential development; l(ri) is land 
per unit of housing; and ni is the number of housing units in state i. Equation (3.3) presumes an elas-
                                                 
4Given that our data is at the state rather than the local level , wages as well as housing prices could be considered 
endogenous and influenced by property tax limits.  A model with endogenous wages would require equilibrium 
conditions characterizing labor market clearing such as found in Harden and Hoyt (2003).  While the impacts on wages 
would need to be considered when evaluating the welfare impacts of tax limits, we believe that the indirect effect of tax 
limits through wages is likely to have little impact on growth in the housing stock. 
5See Sonstelie and Portney (1978) for a formal proof of the relationship between property value maximization and 
efficiency in the provision of local public services.  Of course, this result assumes that the price of housing is the only 
price influenced by changes in government policy, that is, changes in policies are not capitalized into wages as well.  10
tic supply of existing housing. While this assumption may be rather tenuous for a static model of 
housing, as our interest is in the growth of the housing stock, an elastic supply seems much more 
plausible. If we slightly modify (3.3) so that we can relate the growth of housing (∆n) in the state to 
the growth in land available for residential development there (∆L), we have the relationship 
  () () i i i i i i p h r l n r L τ + ∆ = ∆ 1 ) ( ) (          (3.3’) 
 















































6       (3.4) 
where  1 − − = ∆ t t it n n n is the growth in the housing stock from year t-1 to year t in state i. The term θ 
is the price elasticity of supply for land for residential housing; η is the price elasticity of demand for 
land per unit of housing; λ is the share of land in housing; and ε is the price elasticity of demand for 
housing.
7 Then the impact of changes in the property tax rate on the number of households depends 
on the responsiveness of residential land development (θ) to changes in rent, the substitutability in 
capital and land in housing production, the price elasticity of demand for housing and, of course, the 
impact a change in the property tax rate has on the price of housing.  
  While the growth rate depends on the responsiveness of both the production of housing (θ 
and η) and demand (ε) to changes in the price of housing, of most interest to us is how factors that 
affect the price of housing, specifically tax and expenditure limits, will influence the growth in the 
housing stock. Note that the impact of a change in the property tax rate on the growth in the 
housing stock depends on the impact of the tax on the price of housing (term (a)) and the direct 
effect of the tax on the growth in housing (term (b)).  Increases in the price of housing will increase 
housing growth by increasing residential development and housing density (term (a)). The direct 
                                                 
6A derivation of (3.4) is found in the appendix. 


































ε .  11
impact of a tax increase is to increase housing growth by reducing housing per resident, thereby 
reducing land per household and increasing density (term (b)). Of course, if zoning restricts growth 
in development or variation in lot or house sizes then population growth will not be responsive to 
changes in housing prices or property taxes. 
  Thus the impact of a tax or expenditure limit has on housing growth is ambiguous. It de-
pends on the degree to which changes in the property tax rate and other taxes or public services are 
capitalized into property values and the impact the limit has on the tax rates and the provision of 
public services. Reductions in property tax rates through limits, in the absence of resulting increases 
in other taxes and reductions in public services, should increase the supply of housing, that is, stimu-
late development. If, as a response, other taxes are increased and public services are decreased, the 
state becomes less attractive, reducing the demand for housing and reducing the growth in the 
housing stock. 
4.  Data and Empirical Methodology 
4.1 Data 
In this study, we use state-level data from 1980 to 2003. Data on housing, including building 
permits and the housing stock by state, are available from the U.S. Census Bureau on an annual 
basis.
8 Housing permits are categorized by the number of units per building. In our analysis, we 
focus on the growth in total housing units. These data are available from 1980 to 2003.  
Other measures directly related to housing include the vacancy rates and average age of the 
housing stock. As the data on the age of housing are obtained from the decennial censuses we use 
the 1980 values for the years 1980 - 1985; the 1990 value for 1986-1995; and the 2000 value for 1996 
to 2003. The vacancy rate is also available for 1980 and 1986 - 2003.  Both of these variables are 
                                                 
8Data on housing permits are available at http://www.census.gov/const/www/permitsindex.html while data on the 
housing stock are available at http://www.census.gov/popest/housing/HU-EST2004.html for years 2000 to 2004 and 
at the Census archives for 1980 to 1998 (http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/1990s/).  12
treated as proxies for the rate of depreciation in the existing housing stock, a factor influencing the 
supply of housing. As one measure of the cost of housing we have the average annual mortgage 
interest rate for the U.S.
9  In addition, we have the state-level housing price index (HPI) constructed 
by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) using a modified version of the 
Case-Shiller geometric weighted repeat sales procedure (Case and Shiller, 1989).
10  Following Shad-
begian (1999) and others, we include the homeownership rate in the state in some of our estimation 
as a measure of how “transparent” property taxes might be to the population of the state. 
The Census of Governments provides detailed data on both state and local government ex-
penditures and revenues aggregated to the state level for the period 1980 to 2003. From these data 
we constructed a measure of per capita state own-source revenue, per capita local property tax reve-
nue, and per capita other local own-source revenue, all measures in 2003 dollars. We have measures 
of government services that include highway expenditures, spending on higher education, and pri-
mary and secondary education spending as well as the totals for state and local government 
spending. However, we separate state and local expenditures into primary and secondary educational 
spending (per student) and all other state and local spending per capita. This, we feel, is consistent 
with the focus of earlier work on how limits affected primary and secondary education.  
The government policies in which we are most interested, property tax limits were the most 
difficult to obtain, particularly for recent years. Limitations imposed prior to 1992 are documented 
in a report of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR, 1995). Mullins and 
Cox (1995), Mikhailov (1998), and Moak et al. (2004) have some additional information on the 
timing and nature of limits.  As discussed in Section 2, there are different forms of limits currently 
being used by states. We follow a number of studies including Preston and Ichniowski (1991), Joyce 
                                                 
9We use the rate on a 30-year fixed interest mortgage available at http://www.freddiemac.com/pmms/pmms30.htm.  
10 Data on the housing price indexes and an explanation of their construction are available at 
http://www.ofheo.gov/HPIOverview.asp.   13
and Mullins (1991), Shadbegian (1998) and Figlio (1997) and classify the limits as binding, potentially 
binding or not binding, depending upon the legislated rate, levy, and assessment restrictions. The 
combination of a rate and assessment limit is treated as being binding, while the existence of either 
an assessment or rate limit as only potentially binding. While our primary focis is on the impact of 
binding property tax limits, we also consider the separate impacts of limits on property tax revenue, 
rates, and assessments.  See Table 1 for details on these limits. 
Demographic and economic measures, used sparingly in our estimation, include population 
and the population growth rate, measures of racial and ethnic composition of the population, per 
capita real income, employment and growth in employment, earnings, and the state unemployment 
rate. In addition, we also have a measure of property income as a fraction of total income in the 
state. The demographic variables are from the Census Bureau while the economic measures are from 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis or the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
4.2  Empirical Models of the Impacts of Tax and Expenditure Limits on Housing Markets 
  We are interested in the impact of tax and expenditure limits on both the price and growth 
of the housing stock. Following the literature on the impacts of state taxes on employment, we as-
sume that the steady state growth in housing stock nor the equilibrium price of housing are not 
obtained instantaneously.
11  This being the case, we estimate equations of the form 






it it it it it it H D W L P P ε γ λ β β β β δ δ + + + + + + + − = − − 4 3 2 1 1 1 1      (4.1a) 
and 






it it it it it it it H D W L P n n ε γ λ χ χ χ χ χ σ σ + + + + + + + + ∆ − = ∆ − − − 5 4 3 1 2 1 1 1 1   (4.1b) 
where δ and σ are the costs of adjustment for the price and growth in the housing stock and lagged 
dependent variables are included in our estimating equations.  Explanatory variables include mea-
sures of property tax, expenditure, and revenue limits denoted by L; W refers to variables measuring 
relevant economic factors in the state (unemployment rate, wages); D contains relative socio-demo-
                                                 
11See, for example, Helms (1985), and Carroll and Wasylenko (1994), and Harden and Hoyt (2003).   14
graphic factors (population growth, growth in population under 19 and growth in population over 
65); and H denotes characteristics of the housing market including the homeownership rate. 
Following Preston and Ichniowski (1991) we include a regional dummy variable rather than a state-
fixed effect to reflect regional trends in housing markets.   
   Again following earlier studies (Rueben (1996), Figlio (1997), Shadbegian (1998)) in some of 
our estimation we treat the tax and spending limits as endogenous, requiring instruments for the 
limits. For instruments, we use categorical variables indicating whether the state had a limit the pre-
vious year, whether the state has voter-initiatives, the party affiliation of its governor and the poli-
tical composition of its state legislature. In all equations, with or without the use of instruments, we 
use lagged values for the tax and spending limits, somewhat reducing endogeneity concerns.  In 
addition, overidentification tests do not indicate endogeneity of our instruments.
12 
The use of lagged dependent variables in a panel will lead to inconsistent estimates of coeffi-
cients (Nickell, 1981; Hsiao, 1986). Hsiao (1986) shows that the bias associated with the use of a 
lagged dependent variable in a panel is on the order of 1/T, with T being the number of years in the 
panel. Hsiao (1986) also shows the closer the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is to 
unity, the greater the bias.  However, given the length of our panel (23 years), we believe that 
concerns about the endogeneity of the tax and expenditure limits are more pressing. For this reason 
we instrument for tax limits. In addition, following a substantial literature on employment and taxes, 
we use lagged values of our fiscal measures to reduce concerns regarding endogeneity. While we do 
not estimate (4.1) using an Arellano-Bond estimator (Arellano and Bond (1991)) in which we would 
take the first difference of (4.1) and instrument it using Pit-2 –Pit-3  for (4.1a) and  3 2 − − ∆ − ∆ it it n n for 
(4.1b), we do a modification of this procedure in which we use Pit-2 and 2 − ∆ it n as an instrument for 
                                                 
12When we included per capita federal and state aid as instruments, overidentification tests failed, suggesting endogeneity 
of some of the instruments.  15
estimating (4.1).
13   
4.2A.  An Indirect Test of the Impact of Tax and Expenditure Limits on Housing Markets 
  Our second approach to estimating the impact of tax and expenditure limits on housing 
markets is to estimate their impacts indirectly – first by estimating the impacts of tax and expend-
iture limits on government services and revenues and then estimating how changes in these services 
and revenues affect the housing market.  It seems reasonable that both our fiscal variables and 
housing market measures may be affected by common “shocks”, meaning that their error terms are 
likely to be correlated.  This being the case, we estimate a seemingly unrelated system of equations 
(SUR) that includes equations for estimating our fiscal measures and housing measures to exploit 
this possible correlation to increase efficiency as well as to provide a framework for testing nonlinear 
combinations of coefficients across these equations.   
  More formally, let the equations determining the state fiscal policies be given by 










it it t j o , , , , ,
4 3 2 1 1 = + + + + + + + = − ε γ λ α α α α α   (4.2a) 
where the superscript T refers to per capita property taxation; E is educational spending per student; 
O denotes local own-source revenues (taxes and charges) other than property taxes; R refers to per 
capita state own-source revenues; and S is all state and local services except primary and secondary 
education.  Then this system the equations determining the price and growth of the housing stock 
can be expressed as 






it it it it it it H D W G P P ε γ λ β β β β δ δ + + + + + + + − = − 4 3 2 1 1 1      (4.2b) 
and 






it it it it it it it H D W T P n n ε γ λ χ χ χ χ χ σ σ + + + + + + + + ∆ − = ∆ − − 5 4 3 2 1 1 1 1   (4.2c) 
                                                 





X N N ε γ λ β + + + ∑ + =
=
−1  then our IV estimation procedure of (4.1) 
using  2 − ∆ it n as an instrument is essentially the Arellano-Bond estimator.  16
where Git is a vector of our fiscal measures.  Note that in the housing growth equation, the only 
fiscal measure we include is the property tax rate as the other measures should only affect housing 
growth through their impact on the price of housing. 
  Then by estimating this system we can test for the impacts of our limits on both the price 
and growth in the housing market by testing for the significance of the combined effects of the 
limits on the government services and revenues and the impacts of these services and revenues on 
the housing markets.  By “indirectly” testing the impact of these tax and expenditure limits on 
housing markets, we get a better understanding of how and why they might influence or not in-
fluence housing markets.  That is, we can examine the separate impact of reductions in taxes and 
expenditures that occur as a result of tax and expenditure limits on housing markets.   
5.  Results  
Before examining the results of our estimation, it is useful to briefly inspect the summary 
statistics reported in Table 2. In addition to reporting the summary statistics for the entire sample, we 
also provide summary statistics for the sample of state-years in which there was any limit on 
property taxes and for the sample in which there were no property tax limits. Note that this split on 
the sample is based on the existence of any limit; in our estimation we divide the sample based on 
whether it is a binding limit. This will create a much more balanced division in the data. From Table 2 
we can see that per capita real state and local property tax revenues are almost twice as high in those 
state-years in which there is no property tax limit. Interestingly, state income taxes are also almost 
twice as high in these state-years and the state sales tax and other local taxes are higher as well. While 
this division is based on states with and without a property tax limit, it almost appears to be a split 
between “high” tax and “low” tax states. Not surprisingly, expenditures are higher in the states 
without limits. Somewhat surprisingly, states that do not impose limits also receive greater federal 
intergovernmental revenue and provide more state intergovernmental aid to their local governments.  17
The growth in housing stock, measured as a percentage, is higher in states without a limit, 
though the difference seems relatively small. The housing price index is growing faster in the states 
without limits as well. 
5.1  The Determinants of Tax and Expenditure Limits 
  Our interest is not in the determinants of tax and expenditure limits but on their impacts on  
housing markets.  However, because of concerns about the endogeneity of these limits, we employ 
instrumental variable techniques in some of our estimation.  As mentioned, as instruments for these 
limits we use measures of the political climate, specifically the political party of the governor, and 
upper and lower chambers of the legislature. In addition, we also use a dummy variable indicating 
whether the state allows voter initiatives or not.  Given the history of some tax limits as arising from 
“taxpayer revolt” and being the result of voter initiatives, as in the case of Proposition 13, we expect 
whether a state has voter initiatives to be important in determining whether the state has tax and 
expenditure limits. Measures of the political structure and climate in the state are likely to be 
correlated with laws limiting property tax rates and receipts, limits on educational spending, and 
general revenue limits. Such measures are good candidates for instruments since the political 
structure is not likely to be directly related to the process driving home construction or home prices. 
 In  Table 3 we report the results of OLS (linear probability) estimates of the impacts of these 
political measures as well as other economic and demographic variables on the probability that a 
state has these limits.  This is essentially the first stage of our instrumental variable estimation.  Col-
umns (1) and (2) report the results for whether the state has a property tax limit; columns (3) and (4) 
report the results for whether the state has limits on educational spending; and columns (5) and (6) 
report them for whether the state has a limit on general revenue. 
  As can be seen in the table, voter initiatives have a significant impact on the likelihood of 
having a tax or expenditure limit, with initiatives making tax or revenue limits more likely and limits  18
on education spending less likely.  The party of the governor only seems to matter in the determi-
nation of educational spending limits --having a democratic governor makes them less likely.  A 
democratic upper house makes property tax less likely but educational spending limits more likely.  
When we include the demographic and economic variables, the party composition of the lower 
chamber only affects the likelihood of having a general revenue limit in the state. 
  In addition to reporting the coefficients from these first stage estimates, Table 3 also reports 
partial correlation coefficients for each of our four instruments and the F-Statistic for the joint test 
of significance of the coefficients for the instruments. Not surprisingly, the partial correlation coeffi-
cients mirror the coefficients in sign and significance with only a few exceptions.  As with the regres-
sion coefficients, the partial correlation coefficients for initiative with the measures of limits are all 
statistically significant.   
  The F-Statistics for the set of instruments are all significantly different from zero with each 
of the alternative measures of limits.  Based on Bound et al. (1995), the magnitude of our F-Stati-
stics, given the four instruments we use, suggests that the bias of our IV estimates relative to the 
OLS estimates should be quite small – on the order of three percent or less.
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5.2  The Impact of Tax and Expenditure Limits on Housing Markets 
  While we are interested in the impacts of tax and expenditure limits on the housing market 
through their impacts on state and local expenditures and revenues, we first focus on the direct 
impacts of limits on housing markets.  To do this we estimate reduced form equations for both the 
price of housing and growth in the housing stock that include our measures of tax and expenditures 
limits as explanatory variables and exclude any measures of public expenditures and revenues from 
these equations while including our measures of the limits.   
5.2.A  The Impact of Tax and Expenditure Limits on the Price of Housing  
                                                 
14The relative bias for IV and OLS estimates can be found in Bound et al. (1995), Table A.1 (page 450).   19
  Table 4 reports the results of our reduced form estimates for the price of housing (HPI).  As 
is apparent from the examination of both the OLS results (columns (1) – (3)) and the IV results 
(columns (4) – (5)) the coefficients on all three tax and expenditure limits are remarkably stable and 
all highly significant.   
  Our results suggest that a property tax limit increases HPI by 2.11 to 2.84 points, which with 
a mean of 162.0 for the HPI, is about a 1.6% increase. The impact of a limit on general revenue is 
somewhat greater, increasing the HPI by 3.43 points in the OLS estimate and 3.94 in the IV esti-
mate, about a two percent increase.  In contrast, the coefficients on the educational spending limit 
are negative and approximately equal to -3.24, a decrease in the HPI of about two percent.  In col-
umn (3), we find that the property tax limit only has a significant impact on housing prices three or 
more years after it has been instituted. 
  As can be seen in Table 4, a number of other variables have statistically-significant impacts 
on HPI including the income per capita, the poverty rate, the homeownership rate, the mortgage 
interest rate, the unemployment rate, and the proportion of young people in the population.
15 
5.2.B  The Impact of Limits on Housing Permits 
  As with the price of housing, we estimate reduced form equations for housing permits (Per-
mits) with the tax and expenditures limits included as explanatory variables.  The results of this esti-
mation, both with OLS and IV, are reported in Table 5.  In contrast to our results for HPI, neither a 
limit on property tax nor educational spending have any statistically significant impact on the num-
ber of housing permits applied for in a state.  The point estimates for the coefficient on the property 
tax limit ranges from -0.064 to .1804.  Then, as the mean number of permits per 1,000 is 13.66, the 
point estimate suggests a very small impact even if significant, on the order of a 1.4% increase in 
                                                 
15In the results reported in Table 5 for the HPI and Table 6 for permits we do not include any measures of population or 
population growth since growth in the housing stock and population growth are driven by similar underlying factors.  
However, when these variables are included in our estimation the results are quite similar with all coefficients of interest 
having the same sign and levels of significance.   20
permits based on the coefficient of .1804. However, general revenue limits are associated with a 
statistically-significant increase of .94 to 1.05 permits per 1,000 existing homes, an increase of about 
7.3 percent.   
  As can be seen in Table 5, only a few other variables, the unemployment rate, the age of the 
housing stock, and the percentage of the population that is African-American, have statistically signi-
ficant impacts on the growth in the housing stock. 
5.2.C  The Impact of Different Types of Property Tax Limits on Housing Markets 
  As discussed in Section 2, there are three distinct types of property tax limits:  limits on reve-
nues, limits on tax rates, and limits on assessments.  In Tables 4 and 5 we examined the impact of 
binding limits, limits on revenue or on both tax rates and assessments, on the price and growth in 
the housing stock.  In Table 6 we examine the distinct impact of each of the three types of property 
tax limits on housing markets.   In the first four columns, we examine the impacts of the revenue, 
rate, and assessment limits on housing prices.  The OLS and IV results with all three limits included 
in the regression, reported in columns (1) and (3), indicate a positive and significant impact of the 
revenue limit on HPI. In columns (2) and (4) we include the binding limit with the rate and assess-
ment limits as explanatory variables.  Inclusion of the revenue limit is not necessary as it is, by defi-
nition, binding.  When including the binding limit, while it is positive and statistically significant, 
neither the rate nor the assessment limit are significant suggesting it is whether the limit is binding 
that does, in fact, matter. 
  Results for the impact of the three types of limits on housing permits are reported in 
columns (5) – (8).  Given that we found that binding limits had no impact on the number of housing 
permits, it is not surprising that none of the three types of limits has any impact either. 
5.3  The Indirect Impact of Tax and Expenditure Limits on Housing Markets 
  As discussed in Section 3, we expect tax and expenditure limits to affect the price of housing  21
through their impacts on taxes and government expenditures, particularly the property tax rate and 
the level of educational spending.  Housing construction should be influenced indirectly through the 
impacts of limits on housing prices and more directly through the limit on the property tax rate as 
this will affect the gross price of housing and therefore construction. 
 In  Table 7 we report the results of regressions with our fiscal measures - local property taxes, 
primary and secondary educational spending, local own-source revenue less property taxes, state 
own-source revenue, and state and local expenditures other than education – as the dependent 
variables.  All these fiscal measures, with the exception of primary and secondary educational 
spending, are per capita in 2003 dollars; primary and secondary education is in 2003 dollars per stu-
dent.  In addition to including the tax limits as explanatory variables, the regressions include income 
per capita, the poverty rate, population, population growth rate, homeownership rate, earnings per 
work, the unemployment rate, percent African-American, percent Hispanic, percent under the age 
of 19, percent over the age of 65, and regional and time dummies.  
  The results for local property taxes are reported in columns (1) – (4).  Not surprisingly, the 
property tax limit has a negative and statistically significant impact on property taxes though when 
estimated with the IV, the coefficient is much smaller (-$155 to -$157) than when estimated with 
OLS (-$222 to -$241).  The education limit has an even greater impact, reducing property taxes by 
$155 to $161 per capita.  While the coefficient on the general revenue limit is negative and 
statistically significant in OLS, it is not statistically significant in the IV results. 
  As can be seen in columns (5) – (8) both the property tax and educational spending limits 
have large negative impacts on educational spending per student though the coefficients on the 
property tax limit are smaller for the IV results. 
  From inspection of the remainder of Table 7, we see that educational spending limits are 
associated with higher local revenues other than property taxes and lower state own-source revenue.   22
Property tax limits are associated with significant increases in state own-source revenue while limits 
on general revenue are associated with decreases in both state own-source revenue and state and 
local expenditures other than primary and secondary education.    
 In  Table 8 we report the results of three alternative specifications of a system of equations 
that includes equations for the HPI and Permits.  Models (1) to (3) provide seemingly unrelated re-
gression results (SUR) and models (4) to (6) provide the results of a SUR model in which we instru-
ment for the tax and expenditure limits and the lagged HPI.  Our first specification is a model that 
includes an equation for Property Tax and one for HPI that includes the property tax limit as an ex-
planatory variable. Of course, the system also includes an equation for Permits. The second specifi-
cation is similar to the first except that we include all three limits as independent variables in the 
equations for Property Tax and HPI.  Our third specification includes equations for all of the fiscal 
measures and measures of all three limits in these equations but not in the equations for HPI and 
Permits. 
 In  Table 8 we report the coefficients on the limits and fiscal measures for HPI as well as the 
lagged value of HPI; for the Permits equation we report the coefficient on the lagged value of per-
mits, HPI, and the property tax rate. We do not report the estimates for our fiscal measures as they 
are generally very similar to single equation estimates.  Not surprisingly in the models in which the 
limits are included in the equation for HPI (models (1), (2), (4), and (5)) we find very similar results 
to those for the single equation model of HPI.  Across all models, with and without the use of in-
strument variables, the coefficients on Property Tax in the Permits equation are statistically significant 
and negative.  The same is true for the coefficient on HPI in the Permits equation.  In the HPI equa-
tions that include the fiscal measures (models (3) and (6)) we find that the coefficient on Property Tax 
is negative and statistically significant while the coefficient on Education is positive and statistically 
significant.  The coefficient on State Revenue is positive and significant while the coefficients on Other  23
Local Revenue and Other Expenditures are negative and generally significant. 
  Our primary reason for estimating these systems of equations was to test for the impact of 
tax and expenditure limits through their impacts on state and local expenditures and taxes.  While 
the results of our reduced-form estimates for HPI and Permits suggest that limits affect housing 
prices but not construction, they do not give us an indication of why we have or do not have any 
effects from limits.  Further, in the case of the impact on permits, is the statistical insignificance due 
to imprecision in measurement or because of counteracting impacts of the limits on property taxes 
and public services, particularly educational spending?  By estimating a system of equations, we can 
get a better understanding of how tax and expenditure limits influence housing prices. 
 In  Table 9, we present a detailed list of tests on nonlinear combinations of coefficients for 
each of our six specifications.  The first row of the table reports the results of a test of significance 
of the product of the coefficient on the property tax limit from the property tax equation and the 
coefficient on the property tax in the permits equation. Our results generally suggest that the 
property tax limit, through its impacts on the property tax rate, increases the number of permits 
though the results are not always statistically significant.  For our specifications in which Property Tax 
is included as an explanatory variable in the equation for HPI (columns (1)-(2), (5)-(6)) we also need 
to consider how the property tax limit, through its impacts on the HPI, affects Permits.  This effect, 
reported in row (2), is negative and statistically significant in all four specifications. Then for these 
four cases, the total impact of property tax limits on permits is the sum of its impact through the 
property tax (row (1)) and through its impact on the HPI (row (2)).   The sum of these two effects 
are reported in row (3).  As can be seen there, this sum is very small and not statistically different 
from zero – the same result we find when we directly include the property tax limit in the reduced 
form equation for Permits reported in Table 5. 
  A similar test of the significance of the limit on educational spending is performed based on  24
the coefficient of the educational limit in the equations for Property Tax and HPI, and the coefficients 
for the Property Tax and HPI in the equation for Permits.  As the education limit reduces both the 
property tax rate and the price of housing, it will increase permits both through its impact on the 
property tax (row (4)) and through its impact on the HPI (row (5)).  As both impacts are positive, 
then the total impact (row (6)), is positive as well and statistically significant. This is in contrast to 
what we found when the limit was directly included in the permits equation where the impact was 
negative though statistically insignificant. 
  The last system we estimate includes equations for all the fiscal variables as well as for HPI 
and Permits and includes measures of all three limits (columns (3) and (6)).  Again, the effect of the 
limits on HPI and Permits are through their impacts on government services and revenues.  For the 
property tax limit, while we find a positive impact on permits through the property tax rate, the ef-
fect is not statistically significant (column (1)).  Its impact on the price of housing is again positive, 
statistically significant and quite large, 1.35 to 1.43 points in the index for the SUR with and without 
IV (column (3), (6) of row (10)).  This results in a statistically significant reduction in the number of 
permits (row (11)) and, combined, with the smaller positive impact of the property tax limit through 
the property tax, a positive but statistically-insignificant combined impact on Permits (row 12).   
  In contrast, we find a positive and statistically-significant total effect of the educational limits 
on Permits (row (16)) for both estimates of the model.  The impact of educational limits on Property 
Tax leads to increases in the number of permits (row (13)). Educational limits also reduce the price 
of housing, with this effect being much larger and statistically significant for the IV estimates 
(column (6), row (14)).  Then since the reduction in the price of housing increases the number of 
permits (row (15)), the combined effect of an educational limit is to increase the number of permits 
(row (16)). 
  Rows (17) – (20) summarize the results of our tests of the impacts of general revenue limits.   25
While the coefficients are of a much greater magnitude and statistical significance when we employ 
IV techniques, the net impact of the limits on permits is still insignificant. 
6.  Conclusions and Further Work 
While the findings of this study are by no means conclusive and much work remains to be 
done, we believe that our results suggest more work is merited. Our work, like that of other re-
searchers, suggests that both property tax and expenditures limits have had substantial impacts on 
property taxes, educational spending, and state spending. The effects of these limits should not be 
expected to end with their impacts on local budgets as these changes in taxes and services will pre-
sumably impact the behavior of households in the market. Specifically the substantial changes 
occurring in local taxes and services should have impacts in housing markets. 
We consistently find, in both our direct and indirect tests, that property tax and general rev-
enue limits increase housing prices (HPI) while limits on educational spending decrease them.  This 
suggests, along the lines of Brueckner (1979, 1982), that tax and revenue limits increase efficiency in 
the public sector while limits on educational spending decrease it, though these conclusions are 
subject to these limits not affecting other prices, specifically earnings of workers.  Further it is the 
reduction in property taxes as a result of these limits that increase housing prices while the decreases 
in educational spending act to reduce them.  It is primarily the relative impact on property taxes and 
educational spending that explains how the three types of limits differ in their impact on housing 
prices. 
While property tax limits appear to reduce the price of housing, there is mixed evidence on 
whether they have any impact on growth in the housing stock.  This result, or perhaps more ac-
curately, non-result, is not because property tax limits have no impacts on the growth in the housing 
stock. Instead, it is that it has two counteracting impacts – a reduction in the property tax rate and 
an increase in the net price of housing.  This being the case, the impact of the limit on the gross  26
price of housing is ambiguous and the effect on growth in the housing stock is uncertain.  The im-
pacts of the expenditure and revenue limits on housing permits are more ambiguous.  While we find 
no evidence of any impact of the educational limit in our reduced-form estimate for permits, we do 
find evidence of a positive impact from estimating our system of equations.  The reverse is true for 
general revenue limits where we find a positive and significant impact in our reduced-form estimates 
but no impact when estimating a system of equations. 
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Appendix:  Derivation of (3.4) 
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where l is land per unit of housing.  For notational simplicity we derive a static-model version of (3.4) where rather than 
referring to ∆L and ∆n we simply refer to L and n.  We also omit the subscripts referring to state and year.  Totally 
differentiating (3.3) with respect to τ gives 
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Then using the fact that 
l dp
dr 1
=  from (A.1) we can rewrite (A.2) as 
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Then we can express (A.3) as 
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which can further be rewritten as 
 















































x = ˆ and using the fact that L = nlh gives 
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= λ  then solving (A.5) for  τ n ˆ gives 
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or, to be consistent with (3.3’) we can express as: 
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Table 1: Property Tax Limits, by Year of Passage, Type, and Level of Government* 
 
  Rate Restrictions  Revenue (Levy) Restrictions  Assessment 
Restrictions 
State  Overall  School 
District  Municipal  County   Municipal, 
Revenue 
 School District, 
Revenue   County, Revenue  Overall  
Alabama  1972,  1978             
Alaska   1972      1972       
Arizona  1980        1913, 1980  1913, 1980  1913, 1980  1980 
Arkansas         1981 1981 1981  2001 
California  1978,  1986            1978 
Colorado    1992  1992  1992  1913, 1992  1992  1913, 1992  1982 
Connecticut               
Delaware             1972  
DC               
Florida      1922, 1968, 1973  1968        1995 
Georgia      1945  1800s,  1981      
Hawaii               
Idaho  1978  1967  1963  1913  1979, 1992**  1979, 1992**  1979, 1992**   
Illinois   1961  1961  1939  1991 1991 1991  
Indiana      1973,  1977,  1980  1973, 1977, 1980  1973, 1977, 1980   
Iowa   1972,  1974  1989  1983      1978,  1980 
Kansas    1933, 1989  1933, 1989  1933, 1989  1970, 1989    1970, 1989   
Kentucky  1908  1908  1908  1979 1979 1979  
Louisiana  1974  1974  1974  1978 1978 1978  
Maine               
Maryland              1957,  1991 
Massachusetts   1980,  1991     1980,  1983       
Michigan  1933  1949    1978 1978 1978  1994 
Minnesota    1992          1993 
*Limits are missing from this table where the level of government is unclear. 
**Reflects a change in the tax limits imposed earlier.  32
Table 1 (continued) 
 
  Rate Restrictions  Revenue (Levy) Restrictions 
Assessment 
Restrictions
State  Overall  Municipal  School District  County   Municipal   School District   County   Overall  
Mississippi         1980  1983,  1990  1980   
Missouri   1875  1875  1875  1980 1980 1980  
Montana    1965  1971 1931,  1987 1987    1987   
Nebraska   1957  1921  1920  1987 1997 1987  
Nevada  1936, 1979  1929  1956    1983, 1987    1983, 1987   
New  Hampshire               
New Jersey              1980   
New Mexico  1914  1973, 1987  1973, 1987  1973, 1987  1979  1979  1979  1979, 2001 
New  York    1953  1953  1953      1981,  1986 
North  Carolina    1973    1973       
North  Dakota    1929  1929  1929  1981  1981   
Ohio  1929, 1934, 1953        1976  1976  1976   
Oklahoma  1933            1996 
Oregon  1991  1991  1916 1916 1916  1997 
Pennsylvania    1959  1959  1959       
Rhode Island          1985       
South  Carolina               
South  Dakota    1915  1915  1915       
Tennessee               
Texas   1876  1883  1876  1982 1982 1982  1997 
Utah    1929  1929, 1988  1961  1969, 1986**  1969, 1986**  1969, 1986**   
Vermont              
Virginia               
Washington  1944, 1972, 1973  1973    1973  1971, 1979  1971, 1979  1971, 1979  1997, 2000 
West  Virginia  1939  1939  1939  1939  1990 1990 1990  
Wisconsin        1993       
Wyoming   1890  1911  1890       
*Limits are missing from this table where the level of government is unclear. 
**Reflects a change in the tax limits imposed earlier. 33




Property Tax Limit 
With  
Property Tax Limit    
   Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Housing Permits per 1000 Existing Houses 13.7 08.6 12.8 6.7  13.9 09.1
House Price Index (nominal) 162.0 66.8 172.2 73.1  158.9 64.6
House Price Index Growth  5.2% 5.3% 6.2% 6.3% 4.9% 4.9%
State Property Tax*            40.0            84.0            17.4            51.2           46.4            90.2 
Local Property Tax*          960.0       1,195.0       1,565.2       2,273.8         785.6          467.0 
State & Local Property Tax*          999.6       1,203.0       1,579.9       2,287.1         832.4          486.4 
State Total Income Tax*          782.4       1,295.6       1,233.3       2,518.8         654.2          531.7 
State Total General Sales Tax*          590.3          549.0          767.7          976.8         539.9          324.2 
State Total Sales & Gross Receipts Tax*          932.1          926.7       1,290.9       1,772.5         830.1          406.4 
State Total Select Sales Tax*          341.8          415.6          523.2          827.7         290.2          125.0 
State Total License Taxes*          139.1          151.6          150.1          228.6         135.9          121.1 
State Other Taxes*       1,994.3       2,351.2       2,746.4       4,609.4      1,780.5          932.3 
Local Other Taxes*          327.7          679.0          671.3       1,340.5         228.7          183.6 
State Total Intergovernmental Revenue*          987.9          922.7       1,190.8       1,759.2         930.2          448.2 
Local Total Intergovernmental Revenue*       1,242.8       1,352.0       1,674.5       2,587.9      1,118.4          601.1 
State Total Federal Intergovernmental Revenue*          948.1          878.5       1,142.4       1,680.2         892.8          420.6 
Local Total Federal Intergovernmental Revenue*          215.7          549.3          512.2       1,107.5         130.2            59.7 
Local Total State Intergovernmental Revenue*       1,027.1       1,177.8       1,162.3       2,248.9         988.2          572.2 
State & Local Total Highway Expenditures*          496.1          591.8          648.5       1,151.0         452.2          248.9 
State Total Highway Expenditures*          387.1          525.2          521.9       1,041.0         348.8          200.9 
Local Total Highway Expenditures*          170.9          152.3          183.8          239.5         167.2          115.5 
State Total Higher Education Expenditures*          523.9          671.9          777.5       1,406.5         458.2          190.9 
State & Local Educational Expenditures, per student       8,167.9       9,788.9      12,234.1      19,608.9      7,023.7       2,999.5 
1 if a property tax limit in effect the previous year  77.4% 41.9%  
Houses 40 years old or older 28.9% 12.8% 32.8% 13.2% 27.8% 12.4%
Homeownership Rate  66.7 6.7 64.8 10.0  67.2 5.3
Vacancy Rate  1.7 0.6 1.6 0.7  1.7 0.6
Population    4,948,082 5,439,537 3,204,798 2,593,535  5,475,850 5,943,327
Population Growth  1.10% 1.67% 0.94% 2.13% 1.15% 1.51%
Employment 2,697,332 2,945,043 1,805,434 1,381,843 2,967,348 3,226,560
Employment Growth  1.9% 2.0% 1.8% 1.9% 1.9% 2.0%
Annual Wage*  31769.3 5294.6 32984.5 6935.7 31401.5 4627.4
Annual Wage Growth  0.3% 1.8% 0.6% 1.9% 0.2% 1.8%
Income* 25,939.7 5,004.0 27,407.1 6,343.1 25,495.5 4,429.8
Per Capita Income Growth  1.4% 2.5% 1.6% 2.4% 1.3% 2.6%
Unemployment Rate  6.0 2.0 5.9 2.1  6.0 2.0
Percent African American  10.6% 11.9% 14.1% 18.1% 9.6% 9.2%
Percent White  79.2% 15.5% 75.5% 23.8% 80.3% 12.0%
Total Observations with a Property Tax Limit:  953  
Total Observations without a Property Tax Limit:  271  
* per capita in 2003 dollars   
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Table 3:  The Determinants of Tax and Expenditure Limits 
 
Dependent Variable  Limit, Property Tax  Limit, Educational 
Spending  Limit, General Revenue 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Initiative 0.175***  0.206***  -0.205*** -0.236***  0.187*** 0.209*** 
 (5.39)  (6.57)  (-6.40)  (-7.39) (8.53)  (9.48) 
Democratic Governor  -0.019  0.028 -0.090***  -0.079***  0.038**  0.012 
 (-0.70)  (1.06)  (-3.27)  (-2.98) (2.00)  (0.64) 
Democratic Lower House  0.792***  0.079 -0.220 -0.156  0.264***  0.179* 
 (5.69)  (0.56)  (-1.61)  (-1.08) (2.82)  (1.80) 
Democratic Upper House  -0.655***  -0.337** 0.471***  0.343** 0.165*  0.272*** 
 (-4.68)  (-2.53)  (3.41)  (2.53) (1.75) (2.91) 
Income per Capita ($2003)  0.423*** 0.482***   0.000***   -0.000 
 (9.93)  (11.2)    (3.38)    (-0.48) 
Poverty 0.177***  0.111**   0.011*    -0.007* 
 (4.50)  (2.06)    (1.89)    (-1.82) 
Population (1000's)  0.371***  0.105*   0.000*    -0.000** 
 (8.25)  (1.91)    (1.87)    (-2.50) 
Population Growth (%)    -0.000***    0.018*    0.037*** 
   (-10.5)    (1.71)    (4.94) 
Homeownership Rate (%)    -0.010*    -0.015***    0.007*** 
   (-1.90)    (-4.70)    (2.95) 
Earnings per Worker ($2003)    -0.000***    -0.000    0.000*** 
   (-6.23)    (-0.88)    (2.78) 
Unemployment Rate (%)    -0.011    -0.004    0.003 
   (-1.07)    (-0.39)    (0.43) 
African-American (%)    -0.030***    -0.017***    0.002 
   (-9.35)    (-7.12)    (1.27) 
Hispanic (%)    0.000***    -0.006**    0.004*** 
   (9.36)    (-2.24)    (2.62) 
Age > 65 (%)    0.009    0.059***    -0.039*** 
   (0.78)    (5.20)    (-4.96) 
Age < 19 (%)    0.003    0.014    -0.020** 
   (1.49)    (1.10)    (-2.33) 
Midwest   0.019***  0.074*  0.149***  0.203***  0.290*** 
   (8.05)  (1.75)  (3.42) (7.02) (9.63) 
South   -0.025**  -0.076* 0.255***  -0.089***  -0.051 
   (-2.19)  (-1.96)  (4.68) (-3.31) (-1.35) 
West   0.032***  0.564***  0.476*** -0.069**  -0.041 
   (2.59)  (12.7)  (8.50) (-2.26) (-1.05) 
Partial Correlation Coefficients 
Initiative .1455***  0.1912***  -0.1969*** -0.2037*** 0.2319*** 0.2639***
Democratic Governor  -0.0465  0.0150 -0.1173***  -0.1080*** 0.026  0.0347 
Democratic Lower House  0.1579***  0.0461 -0.052* -0.044  0.0736**  0.0598** 
Democratic Upper House  -0.1518*** -0.1106*** 0.0873*** 0.0854*** 0.0334 0.0842***
F-Test of Instruments  15.26*** 15.81***  17.90*** 18.85*** 26.88*** 29.18*** 
Observations 1176  1127  1127  1127  1127  1127 
R-squared 0.20  0.37  0.22 0.32  0.20 0.29 
Robust t statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4:  The Impact of Limits on the Housing Price Index (HPI) 
 
Dependent  Variable  Housing Price Index (HPI) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  OLS  IV 
HPIt-1 0.97347***  0.96558***  0.97480*** 0.96932*** 0.95967*** 
 (81.2)  (82.4)  (80.9) (78.0) (79.2) 
2.84295*** 2.71412***    2.46190***  2.11414**  Limit, Property Taxt-1  
(3.57) (3.47)    (2.90)  (2.54) 
  -3.23762***    -3.22175***  Limit, Educational Spendingt-1  
  (-4.39)    (-4.21) 
  3.43348***    3.94151***  Limit, General Revenuet-1 
  (3.34)    (3.69) 
Limit enacted in past 2 years      -1.62787     
     (-0.71)     
Limit enacted 3-5 years'      3.34837***     
     (2.63)     
Limit enacted 6 or more years       1.14904     
     (1.62)     
Income per Capita ($2003)  0.00088***  0.00103***  0.00074*** 0.00096*** 0.00106*** 
 (3.70)  (4.32)  (3.06) (3.83) (4.20) 
Poverty Rate  0.67282***  0.72146***  0.64807*** 0.72431*** 0.76334*** 
 (5.12)  (5.54)  (4.86) (5.12) (5.47) 
Housing older than 40 years (%) 0.11599  0.04758  0.06669 -0.03971  -0.12804 
 (1.48)  (0.62)  (0.83) (-0.46)  (-1.50) 
Homeownership Rate (%)  0.13145***  0.15107***  0.13100*** 0.22856*** 0.26538*** 
 (2.72)  (2.89)  (2.73) (4.15) (4.42) 
Mortgage Interest Rate  3.50715***  4.17529***  3.44803*** 4.46049*** 5.15065*** 
 (3.55)  (4.20)  (3.44) (4.16) (4.76) 
Earnings per Worker ($2003)  0.00021  0.00013  0.00029 0.00003 -0.00002 
 (1.02)  (0.63)  (1.41) (0.15) (-0.079) 
Unemployment Rate (%)  -3.13617***  -3.18077***  -3.12035*** -3.44616*** -3.49310*** 
 (-8.37)  (-8.60)  (-8.53) (-8.37) (-8.57) 
African-American (%)  0.06477 0.01233  0.03284  0.16323***  0.12411** 
 (1.36)  (0.25)  (0.68) (3.11) (2.31) 
Hispanic (%)  -0.09601  -0.09032 -0.07133  -0.09408*  -0.08808 
 (-1.61)  (-1.54)  (-1.18) (-1.69) (-1.61) 
Age < 19 (%)  1.54605***  1.79738***  1.53453*** 1.46633*** 1.71532*** 
 (5.92)  (6.69)  (5.77) (5.29) (6.02) 
Age > 65 (%)  0.40678  0.41747 0.47520*  0.29147  0.30425 
 (1.48)  (1.57)  (1.72) (1.06) (1.15) 
Observations  1173  1173  1173 1078 1078 
R-squared  0.97  0.97  0.97 0.97 0.97 
Robust t statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5:  The Impact of Limits on the Housing Permits 
 
Dependent  Variable  Housing Permits per 1000 Existing Homes 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  OLS  IV 
Permitst-1 0.86983*** 0.86219*** 0.86952*** 0.86671*** 0.86286***
 (31.7)  (30.7)  (31.7) (31.6) (30.4) 
Limit, Property Taxt-1  0.18045 0.10209    0.06588 -0.06420
 (0.97)  (0.53)    (0.32)  (-0.29) 
Limit, Educational Spendingt-1   -0.16265    -0.16195
   (-0.78)      (-0.70) 
Limit, General Revenuet-1   0.93614**    1.05288**
   (2.10)      (2.16) 
Limit enacted in past 2 years      0.93976     
     (1.30)     
Limit enacted 3-5 years'      0.09219     
     (0.18)     
Limit enacted 6 or more years       0.11373     
     (0.66)     
Income per Capita ($2003) 0.00003  0.00004  0.00003  0.00001  0.00004 
 (0.42)  (0.60)  (0.41) (0.18) (0.61) 
Poverty Rate  -0.02167  -0.02074 -0.02017 -0.03469 -0.02769
 (-0.46)  (-0.43)  (-0.42) (-0.69) (-0.49) 
Homeownership Rate (%)  0.01199 0.00573 0.01229 0.00321 -0.00812
 (0.51)  (0.24)  (0.51) (0.12)  (-0.30) 
Housing older than 40 years (%)  -0.05778***-0.05218*** -0.05742*** -0.06466*** -0.05217**
 (-3.06)  (-2.62)  (-3.01) (-3.11) (-2.48) 
Mortgage Interest Rate 0.15840  0.26410  0.14055  0.36564  0.73564*
 (0.47)  (0.80)  (0.41) (1.05) (1.96) 
Earnings per Worker ($2003) 0.00001  -0.00001  0.00001  0.00001  -0.00005
 (0.070)  (-0.14)  (0.086) (0.077) (-0.49) 
Unemployment Rate (%)  -0.39067***-0.40109*** -0.38461*** -0.40664*** -0.43123***
 (-4.34)  (-4.47)  (-4.27) (-4.32) (-4.33) 
African-American (%)  0.03117* 0.02882 0.03035* 0.03609* 0.04056*
 (1.69)  (1.47)  (1.65) (1.79) (1.76) 
Hispanic (%)  0.01528  0.01906 0.01624 0.01702 0.02459 
 (0.57)  (0.68)  (0.61) (0.62) (0.84) 
Age < 19 (%)  0.13705  0.17237** 0.13350 0.19677** 0.21032**
 (1.61)  (2.07)  (1.55) (2.22) (2.39) 
Age > 65 (%)  0.07857  0.08201 0.07642 0.12777 0.10561 
 (0.75)  (0.78)  (0.72) (1.18) (0.99) 
Observations 1173  1173  1173  1127  1078 
R-squared 0.89  0.89  0.89  0.89  0.89 
Robust t statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  37
 
Table 6:  The Impacts of Alternative Types of Property Tax Limits on Housing Markets 
 
Dependent Variable  Housing Price Index (HPI) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  OLS  IV 
HPIt-1  0.973296*** 0.968092*** 0.968886*** 0.967954*** 
  (79.9) (77.9) (76.2) (76.5) 
Binding Limitt-1   2.8659***   2.502677*** 
   (3.61)  (3.09) 
Rate Limitt-1  0.06283 -0.31204  0.043810  -0.258432 
  (0.084) (-0.44) (0.057) (-0.35) 
Revenue Limitt-1 2.0398***   1.827733**  
  (2.66)  (2.32)  
Assessment Limitt-1  1.3750 0.09875  0.484981  -0.590408 
  (1.59) (0.11) (0.56) (-0.65) 
Observations  1173 1127 1127 1127 
R-squared  0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 
Dependent Variable  Housing Permits per 1,000 Existing Homes 
  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  OLS  IV 
Permitst-1  0.86845708*** 0.86889447*** 0.86505087*** 0.88669522***
  (31.7) (31.6) (31.5) (28.6) 
Binding Limitt-1   0.17290642  0.20351096 
   (0.90)  (1.01) 
Rate Limitt-1  0.1724  0.15095921 0.00000000 0.00000000 
 (0.86)  (0.76)  ()  () 
Revenue Limitt-1  0.05624   0.06404407  
  (0.32)  (0.35)  
Assessment Limitt-1  -0.01166 -0.07138845  0.00000000  0.00000000 
 (-0.04)  (-0.27)  ()  () 
Observations  1173 1173 1127 1127 
R-squared  0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 
Robust t statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All regressions include income per capita, the poverty rate, population, population growth 
rate, homeownership rate, earnings per work, the unemployment rate, percent African-
American, percent Hispanic, percent under the age of 19, percent over the age of 65, and 






Table 7:  A Summary of the Impact of Tax and Expenditure Limits on State and Local Government Expenditures 
and Revenue* 
 
Local Property Taxes   Primary and Secondary Educational Spending  
OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
-240.501*** -221.921*** -157.325*** -154.931*** -1,297.408*** -1,176.722**  -839.000* -819.174*  Limit Property 
Taxt-1   (-4.06) (-3.85) (-2.79) (-2.64) (-2.60) (-2.42) (-1.82)  (-1.80) 
 -154.646***   -161.333***   -1,739.457***    -1,844.349***  Limit, Educational 
Spendingt-1    (-3.18)   (-3.16)    (-4.30)    (-4.33) 
 -139.180**   -86.526    -519.202    -281.252  Limit, General 
Revenuet-1  
 (-2.45)   (-1.43)    (-1.19)    (-0.60) 
Observations 1071  1071  1029  980  1020  1020  980  980 
R-squared 0.29 0.29 0.31  0.31 0.22  0.22  0.23 0.24 
Local Own Revenue Less Property Taxes   State Own Revenue  
OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16) 
-41.185 -39.981 73.654 79.148  592.582***  660.690*** 263.569*** 366.692***  Limit Property 
Tax t-1   (-0.59) (-0.58) (1.15) (1.19)  (6.39) (6.65)  (3.29)  (4.38) 
 211.700***   230.042***    -273.642**   -300.307***  Limit, Educational 
Spendingt-1    (3.85)   (3.99)    (-2.53)  (-2.84) 
 -99.240*   42.792    -598.239***  -773.721***  Limit, General 
Revenuet-1    (-1.77)   (0.76)    (-4.46)  (-5.28) 
Observations  1071  1071 1029  980  1173  1173 1127 1078 
R-squared 0.50 0.50 0.38  0.39 0.47  0.47  0.51  0.53 
State & Local Expenditures Less Education    
OLS  IV     
  (17)  (18)  (19)  (20)         
28.835  72.931  121.177**  173.040***        Limit Property 
Tax t-1   (0.55)  (1.36)  (2.27)  (3.05)       
 -48.632    -53.098        Limit, Educational 
Spendingt-1    (-1.03)    (-1.03)       
 -459.875***    -385.497***       Limit, General 
Revenuet-1    (-5.11)    (-4.23)       
Observations  1071  1071  1029  980       
R-squared 0.74  0.75  0.68  0.68       
Robust t statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
*The dependent variables are real (2003) dollars per capita with the exception of primary and secondary education which is per 
student. All regressions include income per capita, the poverty rate, population, population growth rate, homeownership rate, 
earnings per work, the unemployment rate, percent African-American, percent Hispanic, percent under the age of 19, percent 
over the age of 65, and regional and time dummies.  39
 
          Table 8:  The Impacts of Limits on Housing Prices and Permits using Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR)  
SUR Results 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dependent  Variable  HPI  Permits  HPI  Permits  HPI  Permits 
0.96204*** -0.01215*** .95561*** -.01211*** 0.9351***  -0.009786*** HPIt-1 
(106.51) (-4.41) (106.06) (-4.39) (99.66)  (-3.48) 
 0.8212***  .8216***   0.8162***  Permitst-1 
 (50.73)  (50.64)   (49.24) 
2.1409***  2.0331***       Limit,  
 Property Taxt-1   (3.11)  (2.95)      
   -2.556***      Limit, Educationt-1 
   (-3.53)      
   1.647       Limit, General 
Revenuest-1     (1.53)      
 -0.0002158***   -.00021**  -0.00971***  -0.000233** Property Taxt-1  
 (-2.59)  (2.49)  (-6.62)  (-3.48) 
     0.000922***    Educationt-1 
     (5.55)   
     0.001158**    State Revenuet-1 
     (2.88)   
     -0.001449*    Other Local Revenuet-1 
     (-1.80)   
     -0.00265***    Other Expenditurest-1 
     (-3.46)   
"R-Squared" 0.9662  0.8916 .9667  .8916  0.9700  0.8927 
SUR with IV 
  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  HPI  Permits  HPI  Permits  HPI  Permits 
.9585*** -.01052***  .9532*** -.01054*** .9350***  -.00978*** HPIt-1 
(105.82) (-3.74)  (105.28) (-3.74) (99.65)  (-3.48) 
 .8254***   .8261***   .8161***  Permitst-1 
 (49.86)   (49.80)   (49.24) 
2.192***   1.816**       Limit,  Property Taxt-1  
(3.01)   (2.58)      
   -2.484***      Limit, Educationt-1 
   (-3.36)      
   2.2067**       Limit, General 
Revenuest-1     (2.03)      
 -.0002351**  -.000234** -.009688***  -.0002337** Property Taxt-1  
 (-2.77)   (-2.75)  (6.61)  (-2.71) 
      .0009171***    Educationt-1 
      (5.52)   
      .00116***    State Revenuet-1 
      (2.89)   
      -.00147***    Other Local Revenuet-1 
      (-1.83)   
      -.002646***    Other Expenditurest-1 
      (-3.45)   
“R-Squared” .9683  .8928 .9688  .8928  .9700 .8927 
Limits included  Property Tax  All  All 
Equations included  Property Tax  Property Tax  All 
Robust t statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
*All regressions include income per capita, the poverty rate, population, population growth rate, homeownership rate, 
earnings per work, the unemployment rate, percent African-American, percent Hispanic, percent under the age of 19, 
percent over the age of 65, and regional and time dummies. 40
Table 9: Tests of the Impacts of Tax and Expenditure Limits on Housing Prices and Growth 
 
SUR  SUR with IV    Limit    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
0.03873* .0336 0.0460* .05447* .04566*  1.0851  1  On Permits through Property 
Tax  (1.77) (1.63) (1.85)  (1.99) (1.85)  (1.11) 
-0.2600** -.02463**   -.02341**  -.01915**   2  On Permits through HPI 
(-2.55) (-2.45)    (-2.49)  (-2.13)   
0.01273 .00899   .0314  .0265   3 
Property 
Tax 
On Permits through Property 
Tax and HPI  (0.55) (0.41)    (1.13)  (1.05)   
 .04787*     .0424*   4  On Permits through Property 
Tax   (1.92)     (1.76)   
 .03107**     .02618**    5  On Permits through HPI 
 (2.76)     (2.51)   
 .07884**     .0686**   6 
Education 
On Permits through Property 
Tax and HPI   (2.86)     (2.60)   
 .01649     .0286    7   On Permits through Property 
Tax   (0.69)     (0.99)   
 -.01996     -.02325*    8   On Permits through HPI 
 (-1.44)     (-1.78)   
 -.00346     .005341   
9 
Revenue 
  On Permits through Property 
Tax and HPI   (-0.13)     (0.18)   
   1.352***     1.433*** 10 
On HPI through all 
Government Services/Taxes     (4.62)      (3.53) 
   -.01389**     -.0140** 11 
On Permits through 
Government Services via HPI    (-2.86)     (-2.49) 
   .03215     .0121  12 
Property 
Tax 
On Permits through Property 
Tax and HPI     (1.33)      (0.49) 
   .05699**     .3476**  13  On Permits through Property 
Tax     (2.05)      (2.46) 
   -.1496     -3.8915*** 14  On HPI through all 
Government Services/Taxes     (-0.62)     (-3.69) 
   .001539     .0381**  15  On Permits through 
Government Services via HPI    (0.54)      (2.56) 
   .05854**     .3856**  16 
Education 
On Permits through Property 
Tax and HPI     (2.15)      (2.71) 
   .01946     .2458*  17  On Permits through Property 
Tax     (0.68)      (2.01) 
   .6008      5.829*** 18  On HPI through Government 
Services/Taxes     (1.63)      (3.27) 
   -.006181     -.05704** 19  On Permits through 
Government Services via HPI    (-1.49)     (-2.37) 
   .0133      .1887  20 
Revenue 
On Permits through Property 
Tax and HPI     (0.49)      (1.57) 
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